Addendum for:


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Second Lebanon War, 2006

More details about Second Lebanon War rocket attacks are available in Rubin (2007). Its appendix includes a diagram of daily rocket fire from the Jewish Virtual Library (2018). That data was used to produce the supplementary analysis below.

![Arriving rockets per day](Image)

The rocket fire can be divided into 3 parts, aside from a partial cease fire on 1-2 August.

1. The air attack phase, 12-21 July. It averaged 91.4 rockets/day.
2. The early land attack phase, 22-30 July. It averaged 115.3 rockets/day.
3. The later land attack phase, 2-13 August. It averaged 165.4 rockets/day.

The average was significantly higher during part 3, the later land attack phase (t-test \( p = 0.005 \)). The standard deviations did not differ significantly. None of the parts showed significant trends.

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Operation Protective Edge, 2014

Some sources mention much higher numbers of rockets during Protective Edge.

- Rubin (2015) states “Hamas reported firing 3,621 rockets and mortar bombs and Islamic Jihad reported a total of 3,249 firings”, a total of 6,870 projectiles. It cites a Hebrew Wikipedia page as the source of those counts.
• UNHCHR (2014) states that “Between 8 July and 26 August, Palestinian armed groups fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel”, a total of 6,634 projectiles. It cites the United Nations Department of Safety and Security as the source of those counts.

These two sets of counts are similar to each other, suggesting they both cover the numbers reported fired by the attacking militants. Also, the UNHCHR (2014) count of 1,753 mortar shells is very close to the ISA (2014) count of 1,724. However, the two sources differ substantially on rocket counts: 4,881 (UNHCHR 2014) versus 2,968 (ISA 2014), respectively. Some possible reasons for that difference are below.

• The UNHCHR counts rockets fired from Gaza, while the ISA counts ones arriving in Israel. Rockets that misfired or landed in Gaza would be counted by the former but not the latter.
• Israel may not have detected every rocket. E.g., IDF radars might not have seen rockets launched on flat direct fire trajectories near the border. Rubin (2015) suggests smaller rockets might have gone undetected; but Iron Dome radars can detect even machine gun bullets.
• For propaganda or military secrecy, attacking militants may have overstated their counts (Rubin, 2015) while Israeli defenders may have understated theirs (Finkelstein, 2018).

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Comparing Losses to Arrivals: Civil Defense

In Figures 6 and 7 the horizontal axes are labeled incorrectly. They should be like Figure 5, i.e., “Baseline values”, “Pillar of Defense”, and “Protective Edge”. Corrected versions are below.

Figure 6. Fatality rate changes attributed to civil defenses
**Figure 7.** Casualty rate changes attributed to civil defenses

![Graph showing casualty rate changes attributed to civil defenses](image)

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**References**


